Source

A transcription[1] of the discussion between the German Chancellor and Mr. McCloy, the American High Commissioner, on July 12, 1950 at Schloss Deichmannsaue.[2] Also present were General Hays and Mr. Blankenhorn. The Chancellor elaborated in detail on the particular concerns of the German people and the West German government as a result of the steadily worsening international situation[3] arising from the Korean War.[4] At the same time, he strongly emphasized that a particular restlessness had taken hold of the German population on account of the country’s lack of an adequate defense. This had also been the point of his letter addressed to the High Commission on July 1, 1950.[5] The crucial aspect of the security problem facing Germany, he said, was that both the Russians and the Western powers wanted to possess the potential that West Germany now represented in terms of its people and its industrial capacity should we be faced with the outbreak of a Third World War or perhaps even only with a looming war. In a confrontation between the two world powers, possessing this German potential could be the decisive factor.[6] Understandably, there is particularly great concern among the population that the substantial Russian forces in the Eastern zone could mount a sudden invasion. By contrast, the forces in Germany were too weak both numerically and in terms of equipment. He was informed by Count Schwerin, who received information from a very reliable source, that in the past three months seven additional battle-ready Russian divisions had arrived in the area of Guben (Lusatia). It is also known that the other approximately 23 Russian divisions were ready to move and could be deployed within 24 hours.[7] In the Western zones, by contrast, there have been no indications of any preparations. Supposedly, the purpose of the discussions between Count Schwerin and Mr. Blankenhorn on the one hand and General Hays on the other, which took place on Monday afternoon,[8] was to determine if any measures could be initiated immediately in case of emergency, because it would be untenable for the German government to be unprepared for the massive flow of refugees that would immediately ensue in the event of a Russian invasion. Although the current size of the American and British occupying forces is relatively large, he hoped that it would still be possible to reinforce currently active units.[9] General Robertson had assured the Chancellor on the occasion of his last discussion[10] that he wanted to slowly increase the size these active units to 70,000 and have them better equipped and trained. The Chancellor would consider it very desirable if this were done by the American side.[11] However, in order to be able to discuss our wishes, plans, and ideas for defense with the Allies in an expedient manner, it would be necessary to establish continuous contact between German and Allied experts. The Chancellor would be grateful if such contact could be set up as soon as possible. Mr. McCloy responded to these statements as follows: He certainly shares the Chancellor’s concerns. There is no question that if the Russians invaded tomorrow, Allied forces would be insufficient. He stressed, however, that he was doing everything in his power to reinforce the occupation forces by procuring special troops from America. He welcomed the idea of strengthening active units and has already given corresponding directives to the American commander-in-chief, General Handy.[12] He also agreed that there should be continuous contact between German military experts and Allied authorities. He believes it would be expedient if this contact took place initially between Mr. Blankenhorn, Count Schwerin, and General Hays.[13] He requested that all German proposals regarding the various areas of concern be submitted to General Hays in order to further cooperation with American headquarters.[14] He himself was extremely doubtful as to whether a German remilitarization would be expedient. He was inwardly reluctant to re-establish a German army whose leadership would undoubtedly try to influence the slowly developing democracy in a militaristic direction. He did not trust the German generals, who had learned nothing and who would all too easily make the democratic state serve their purposes. It would be better not to talk about rearming Germany until this democratic state can be more firmly established. What is more, it is quite doubtful that the Russians would just stand idly by and watch Germany rearm itself. He does not believe that a Russian attack is imminent. In addition, he has not heard anything about reinforcements in the Guben area. According to his information, Russian troops would not march this summer. He does, however, realize that all eventualities must be taken into consideration. He believes that any military conflict, which is probably unavoidable, would not begin before mid-1951 or even 1952.[15] He is, however, worried by the troop concentrations on the Yugoslav border and the movements of the Czechoslovak army. From the American perspective, it is not at all clear how to interpret the movements of the Czechoslovak army— whether these were maneuvers serving a reorganization of the Czech army or if they indicate a deployment in the direction of southern Germany. The Chancellor responded emphatically that something must be done to ensure the defense of West Germany, which is so important to Western Europe and therefore also to the United States. Should it be lost, it would be enormously difficult to defend the Western world against the Soviet Union. The Russians would not hesitate to use the potential of Germany against the West. Developments in Korea have severely damaged the authority and prestige of the United States. He said that he hoped these setbacks would serve to encourage the United States in future to intensify its preparations in all parts of the world.[16]